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THE MOST DANGEROUS JUSTICE RIDES 
INTO THE SUNSET 
Paul H. Edelman* 
Jim Chen** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Spatial models of voting behavior suggest that the prefer-
ences of the median voter, under majority rule and with a single 
issue dimension, will determine policy outcomes. 1 This theoreti-
cal insight has been applied to numerous policymaking institu-
tions, and the Supreme Court of the United States is no excep-
tion.2 Identifying and analyzing the median voter on the Court 
has generated something of a cottage industry, both in scholarly 
research and in the popular press.' Yet identification of the 
"power center" on the Court may depend on the methodology 
employed and on the assumptions that underlie evaluators' 
methodological choices. 
One key assumption often made is that the Justices' voting 
patterns in most cases can be arrayed along a single ideological 
dimension. Although the Justices' voting behavior in non-
unanimous cases will often fall along predictable ideological 
lines, a substantial minority of cases exhibit coalitions that are 
Professor of Mathematics and Law. Vanderbilt University. We have profited 
from the comments and assistance of Tracey George. and especially from the insights and 
advice of Stefanie Lindquist. 
•• Dean and Professor of Law. University of Louisville. Louis D. Brandeis School 
of Law. 
I. Duncan Black. On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. 56 J. POL. ECON. 
23 (194X). 
2. See generally Andrew D. Martin. Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein. The Medw11 
Justice on the United Sillies Supreme Court, X3 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005). 
3. See, e.g. Mark Sherman "Justice Kennedy the Key in Close Cases." USA Today 
(April 7. 2007) (describing the pivotal role now played by Kennedy rather than 
O'Connor in close cases): Jeffrey Toobin. "Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Pas-
sion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court." The New Yorker Magazine 
(Sept. 12. 2005) (same): Warren Richey. "Supreme Court's New Man in the Middle." 
Christian Science Monitor (July 3. 2006) (same). 
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not so predictable. Consider, for example, the 2007 decision in 
Philip Morris v. Williams" -in which the Court invalidated a pu-
nitive damage award to the widow of a deceased smoker because 
the jury had improperly calculated that award based on harm to 
smokers other than the widow's husband. Voting in the majority 
were Justices Roberts, Alito, Breyer, Kennedy, and Souter. In 
dissent were Justices Ginsberg, Stevens, Thomas, and Scalia. 
These odd coalitions clearly fail to conform to expectations con-
cerning the Justices' shared policy preferences. In short, such an 
outcome is inconsistent with the notion that the Justices' votes 
are best described in all cases as the product of a single ideologi-
cal dimension. 
The presence of unpredictable voting coalitions suggests 
that Supreme Court Justices' decisions may in some cases be 
structured along divergent or cross-cutting issue dimensions. 
These alternative issue dimensions can complicate the identifica-
tion of the Court's pivotal justice. To account for and accommo-
date these alternative dimensions, our earlier research' con-
structed a method for identifying the most powerful Justice 
without relying on the assumption of unidimensional policy 
preferences. Instead, earlier efforts focused on the unique policy 
coalitions formed by the Justices in non-unanimous cases. We 
ranked the Justices in terms of their individual ability to alter or 
shape Court outcomes. Rather than focusing solely on the identi-
fication of the Court's median Justice, we calculated a power in-
dex that allowed us to rank all of the Justices in terms of voting 
power. In this paper, we identify the most powerful Justice for 
each term of the Rehnquist Natural Court (1994 to 2004), com-
pleting our analysis of the longest natural 9-member Court in 
history. 
4. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) 
5. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen. The Mmt Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court 
at the Bar of Mathematics, 70S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1996) [hereinafter "Dangerous .Jus-
tice"]; Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen. "Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts ahout the 
Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, 70S. CAL. L. REV. 219 (1996) [hereinafter "Duel Dili-
gence"]; Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen. The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisit-
ing the Power Pageant of the .Justices. 86 MINN. L. REV. 131 (2001) [hereinafter "Rides 
Again"]. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
A. THE MADNESS OF OUR METHOD 
Our previous articles have explained our methods at length. 
For the sake of brevity we will give just the barest outline of our 
techniques and refer readers to our earlier work for further dis-
cussion and justification. 
We begin by assembling the collection of unique coalitions 
that formed during the relevant Terms of the Court. By a coali-
tion we mean a subset of the Justices who agreed on a legal 
proposition and whose complementary set of Justices did not 
agree. These legal propositions could be a complete opinion, or 
an agreement in part of an opinion. In particular, if a Justice 
concurs in a judgment but does not join the opinion, then he or 
she is not part of the coalition associated with that opinion. 
It is particularly important to note that we do not keep track 
of the number of times a particular coalition forms. While this 
decision is certainly subject to criticism, we believe that it is justi-
fiable. Since the Justices have substantial control over their 
docket, a single coalition can agree to hear multiple cases. For 
the purposes of assessing the Justices' ability to form multiple 
coalitions, counting the coalitions by the number of times they 
appear overstates the power of the individual Justices involved. 
From this collection of data we compute three different in-
dexes: the Sophisticated Index, the Na'lve Index, and the Modi-
fied Median Index. The Sophisticated Index is a variant of the 
Banzhaf index, and is computed only over cumulative data. The 
Naive Index accounts solely for the 5-4 decisions of the Court, 
and we compute it both Term-by-Term and cumulatively. The 
Modified Median Index is our variant of an index proposed by 
Lynn Baker," which we also compute Term-by-Term and cumu-
latively.7 
The Naive Index is computed simply by counting the num-
ber of times that a Justice appears in a 5-Justice coalition and 
then normalizing so that the numbers add to 100 percent. It suc-
cinctly captures the notion that power is related to the number 
of times that a Justice's vote is decisive with respect to the out-
6. Lynn Baker. lnterdtsciplinary Due Diligence: The Case j(Jf Common Sense in the 
Search j(" the Swing Justice. 70S. CAL. L. REV. IH7 (19'16). 
7. We have actually worked with a number of other indices. but these three seem 
to be the ones that best capture the idea of voting power. See Edelman & Chen, Rides 
Again. supra note 5. 
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come. It is easy to compute and meaningful both on a Term-by-
Term basis as well as cumulatively. 
If all the Justices are equally powerful, each Justice will be 
assigned a power of 11.1 %. To facilitate our analysis we compute 
the Judicial Quotient for each judge by rescaling the numbers by 
a factor of 9, so a 11.1% index results in a quotient of 100. We 
follow this convention for all of our indices. 
The Sophisticated Index expresses the intuition that not 
every Justice in a 5-Justice coalition has a credible threat of de-
fecting. Those Justices without such a threat should not be 
deemed powerful in the coalition. To identify those Justices that 
do have a credible threat, we examine whether the other four 
Justices have ever themselves formed a coalition. If they have, 
then there is evidence that the Justice in question has indeed de-
fected and so we assign him power in that coalition. On the other 
hand, if the other four Justices have never formed a coalition 
then we assume that the Justice in question does not have a 
credible threat to defect. We therefore assign that Justice no 
power in that coalition. For each Justice, we total the number of 
5-Justice coalitions in which he or she has power, and then nor-
malize those scores so they add to 100. The result is the Sophisti-
cated Index for each Justice. Because of the very stringent re-
quirement of assigning power only for a credible threat of 
defection, the Sophisticated Index works poorly on Term-by-
Term data. The number of cases heard by the Court does not al-
low enough coalition formation to manifest itself in a single 
term. We thus only compute the Sophisticated Index for cumula-
tive data. 
Finally, we compute the Modified Median Index. This index 
is our variant of a computation suggested by Lynn Baker." It at-
tempts to capture the intuition that the power of a Justice is 
measured by how close that Justice is to the median. To compute 
this index, we tally the number of winning combinations (i.e. 
coalitions of size 5 or greater) that contain a particular Justice, 
and then normalize so the scores add to 100%. Though we be-
lieve that this statistic does capture certain aspects of power, we 
remain skeptical of the notion that the median Justice is the 
Court's most powerful member. 
8. Baker. supra note n. 
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B. THE MEDIAN IS NOT THE MESSAGE REDUX'1 
In response to the first of our articles, Lynn Baker proposed 
that a better approach to assessing voting power was to seek to 
identify the median Justice. 111 The intuition was that the closer a 
Justice was to the median, the more power that Justice would 
have. In a purely one-dimensional spatial voting model, of 
course, the median Justice has all of the power. We further chal-
lenged Professor Baker's assertion by questioning whether the 
Median Voter Theorem really applies to the Court. 11 In particu-
lar we argued that the cases before the Court were not predomi-
nately one dimensional 12 and that the quest for a median Justice 
would therefore be fruitless. 
Since that exchange there have been a number of methodo-
logical advances in the search for a median Justice. 13 One paper 
in particular challenged our assertion specifically: "We too can 
identify particular cases that violate the condition of a single-
dimension issue space but, as it turns out, the great majority of 
disputes before the Supreme Court do not. E.g., of the 8,889 case 
in which the Court heard oral arguments and decided between 
the 1953 and 2002 terms, only 3.79 percent (n=337) contained 
more than one issue ... See Harold J. Spaeth, United States Su-
preme Court Database, ... " 14 We remain unpersuaded. 
This appeal to Harold Spaeth's database leaves unanswered 
the question of whether the one-dimensional spatial voting 
model realistically and usefully tracks the behavior of the Su-
preme Court. While the unidimensional model may indeed be 
adequate for many situations, we doubt whether it is adequate 
for capturing the very fine-grained nature of locating the median 
Justice. To illustrate this concern, we will show that even a very 
sophisticated method of finding the median Justice leads to 
9. Cf. Edelman & Chen. Duel Diligence, supra note 5 Section III A (The Median 
is Not the Message). at 230. 
10. Baker. supra note 6. 
II. Edelman & Chen, Duel Diligence. supra note 5, at 231. 
12. "It verges on the unsporting to name a multidimensional Supreme Court con-
troversy." /d. 
13. See, e.g .. Bernard Grofman & Timothy Brazill, ldenti{ying the Median Justice 011 
1he Supreme Coun through Muilidimensional Scaling: Analysis of "Natural Courl'' ]1)53-
JI)I)J. 112 PUB. CHOICE 55 (2002) and Martin et al., supra note 2. This latter paper is 
based on the very sophisticated methodology developed in Andrew D. Martin & Kevin 
M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Poilll Estimation via Markov Chain Mollie Carlo f(Jr the U. S. 
Supreme Court,/1)53-JI)I)I), 10 POL. ANAL. 134 (2002). . 
14. Martinet al. supra note 2. at n.35 (parenthetical omitted.) 
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problematic results that cast doubt on the consistency of the re-
sults with the observed coalitional structure of the Court. 
There are two reasons why we reject the above-cited nu-
merical rejoinder and appeal to the Spaeth database. The first is 
that the 3.79% figure expresses very little about the number of 
cases with a multi-dimensional issue space. The second is that 
the coding used to construct the Spaeth database is not a reliable 
indicator of the dimension of the issue space in the case. We will 
deal with each objection in turn. 
Where did the 3.79% figure come from? The authors inform 
us that it is percentage of the Supreme Court cases decided be-
tween 1953 and 2002 in which there was a "split vote. " 1' A split 
vote case is one in which "one or more of the justices voted with 
the majority on one issue or aspect of the case and dissented on 
another." 1" Unfortunately the authors never explain the connec-
tion between cases with a split vote and the dimension of the is-
sue space in question. We think there is a good reason for that 
omission: there is no connection. 
There may be a number of reasons why there are split votes. 
There could be a threshold issue that the Court has to decide, 
such as standing, before the Court can reach the merits. 17 Or 
there may be multiple issues in dispute that are independcnt. 1' In 
15. This follows from the specification in the footnote that computation was done 
by specifying in the database "analu=4: dec_typel. 6. or 7." The "dec_type" specification 
specifies cases for which there is a formally decided signed opinion, per curiam cases. or a 
JUdgment of the Court. The "analu=4" specification indicates cases in which there is a 
split vote. For complete specifications see Documentation, The Original United States 
Supreme Court Judicial Database. 1953-2005 (Harold J. Spaeth, principal investigator). 
http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/allcourt_codebook.pdf, [hereinafter "Code-
book"] We are somewhat confused about exactly what Martinet al .. computed, since in 
trying to duplicate their work we found this number to be .63%. If. on the other hand. 
they meant to report the number of multiple issue cases (analu=2) then we get a number 
very close to theirs. 3.77%. Since our split-vote numbers are even more exaggerated than 
theirs. we will operate on the assumption that it was indeed the split vote cases that they 
meant to report. We will deal with the question of whether we really should be con-
cerned with the multiple-issue cases later in this section. 
16. Codebook. supra note 15, at 3. 
17. See. e.g .. United States v. Vuitch. 402 U.S. 62 (1971), in which Justices Harlan 
and Blackmun dissented from the majority in their assertion of jurisdiction, but then 
went on to vote to reverse the lower court and uphold the statute on the merits. See Suz-
anna Sherry. Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. S65. SS4 (199S). 
18. See. e.g .. Williams v. Taylor. 529 U.S. 392 (2000). Justice Stevens delivered the 
first part of the majority opinion (joined by Souter. Ginsberg, Breyer. O'Connor and 
Kennedy) finding that the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel was vio-
lated. Justice O'Connor delivered the second part of the majority opinion (joined at least 
in part by Kennedy. Rehnquist. Scalia and Thomas). finding that new federal statute lim-
ited the defendant's habeas nghts. 
2007] DANGEROUS JUSTICE RIDES INTO SUNSET 205 
either of these cases, however, the issue dimension could be one 
or higher. There is little reason to believe one or the other. 
On the other hand, it is easy to have a multidimensional is-
sue space and no split vote at all. Indeed, split votes are about 
the number of issues, not about the dimension of the issue space. 
There is no reason to connect one to the other. We thus con-
clude that the 3.79% figure is meaningless. 
The authors might have investigated the percentage of cases 
that are coded as having multiple legal provisions. In the lan-
guage of the Spaeth database, "analu=3". The percentage of 
such cases is 16.9%, a considerable increase. This collection of 
cases does not perfectly capture the dimensionality of the issue 
space, since many of the legal provisions may be related to the 
same issue. On the other hand, it is possible that the same legal 
provision (for example, equal protection) may be relevant to 
multiple dimensions. Our intuition is that these cases are both 
under- and overinclusive of cases with multidimensional issue 
space. 
Well, if these are imperfect measures, is there a better one 
that can be located in the Spaeth database? There is a coding for 
"issue," which "identifies the context in which the legal basis for 
decision ... appears."~~ The code book states: "Although the cri-
teria for the identification of issues are hard to articulate, the fo-
cus here is on the subject matter of the controversy rather than 
its legal basis .... The objective is to categorize the case from a 
public policy standpoint, a perspective that the legal basis for de-
cision commonly disregards." 2" But to "characterize the case" is 
to almost surely identify a single issue at stake in the case. Not 
surprisingly, that is what happens; there are very few cases for 
which the database identifies multiple issues. 21 Does that settle 
the question? We think not. 
First, just because a single issue is identified hardly means 
that the issue space is unidimensional. For example, there is a 
code for the issue "abortion: including contraceptives."22 Is this 
issue truly one-dimensional? Often it arises in the context of 
19. Code book. supra note 15. at 42. 
20. !d. 
21. For cases decided from the OT 1'153 through OT 2002 there were roughly 
3.77% classified as multiple issue cases. The search was made using "analu=2: 
dec_type1.6. or 7." 
22. This is coded as 533 and is considered as a subset of due process. Code book su-
pra note 15. at 41\. 
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O'Connor's undue burden test, 21 which is inherently a balancing 
test. Would not a better description of the issue space, then, be 
at least two-dimensional, with one dimension indicating the 
strength of the right to an abortion, and the other indicating the 
burdensome magnitude of the restriction? It is not hard to be-
lieve that some restrictions would be so de minimis that even a 
prochoice Justice would have no objection24 or that a generally 
pro-life Justice might strike down an anti-abortion bill if it were 
to become too burdensome. 25 Giving an issue a single code does 
not make it a single dimension. 
A further problem with relying on the Spaeth coding as dis-
positive on the dimension of the issue space is Spaeth's reliance 
on the opinion of the Court. His coding of the primary issue is 
based on what the Court says is the most important issue. A par-
ticular telling illustration of this fact comes from the Supreme 
Court Forecasting Project. This project developed a computer 
algorithm to predict the votes of the Justices during October 
Term 2002. The input for the program was a coding of each case 
based upon the petitioners' merits briet_2fi Spaeth himself origi-
nally coded about half of the cases and the other half (about 34) 
were tentatively coded by the authors of organizers of the pro-
ject. Subsequently Spaeth recoded about half of those tentatively 
coded cases, and the coding changed in 16 of the recoded cases, 
just slightly less than halt_27 
The Spaeth database claims a very high level of inter-coder 
agreement.2' What could account for such a massive disagree-
ment? The Spaeth database is coded on the basis of the Court 
opinions after the decision, while the Forecasting Project re-
quired a coding before the decisions were rendered. It is always 
easier to code a case when the winners have announced what the 
issues were. Relying on the merits briefs, in which every possible 
issue will be joined, broadens the view of the case and makes 
coding much more erratic. 
23. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. ~33, ~77 (1992). 
24. For example, a law requiring that a patient state their legal name before receiv-
ing an abortion could hardly be considered a burden. 
25. For example one that does not allow for an exception for the life of the mother. 
26. Theodore W. Ruger, et a/., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and 
Political Science Approaches to Predic.:ting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1150 n.45 (2004). 
27. Suzanna Sherry. What's Law Got to Do with It!, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 769, 773 
(2004). 
28. Codebook supra note 15. at 75ff (offering specific information about any errors 
identified during reliability check. of which there were few). 
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For this reason, one should not credit the claim that the 
Spaeth database finds multiple issues in only a small percentage 
of Supreme Court cases. The Spaeth database codes the out-
come on the basis of the opinion, and that opinion has little rea-
son to credit any alternative interpretation of the case. As a spe-
cific example, consider the Rosenberger case,2~ which we cited 
when we first addressed the question of multi-dimensionality."' 
The Spaeth database codes this case as having a single issue: es-
tablishment of religion. The coding does acknowledge that there 
are two legal provisions implicated, the free speech clause and 
the establishment clause, but somehow decides that the sole pol-
icy issue was about establishment. Thus the coding is inherently 
biased toward the assumption that the issue space of every case 
is one dimensional. Moreover, the choice to code Rosenberger as 
an establishment controversy almost certainly led to the coding 
of this decision as conservative. Had the choice been made to 
characterize the case as a free speech case, then the result would 
probably have been coded as liberal. It is also a little odd that 
the database chose to characterize the issue as the establishment 
clause when the majority viewed it as viewpoint discrimination. 
There is yet one other database that one might use to sup-
port the claim that cases before the Court are overwhelmingly 
one-dimensional. There is a Justice-centered database whose 
unit of analysis is each individual Justice.'' The authors of the da-
tabase include a set of deviation variables which "specif[y] the 
deviations of the individual justices from their colleagues with 
respect to the legal provision at bar in the case, the issue on 
which the case turns, and the basis on which the justice rests his 
or her vote."'2 One might think that the number of deviations in 
the "issue" variable in a case might be a measure of the multidi-
mensionality of the issue space. The percentage of cases that 
have one or more deviations among the Justices is less than 1 %.'' 
Does this number support the assertion that there are very few 
cases in which the issue space is multi-dimensional? No. 
29. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. ii19 
(1995). 
30. Edelman & Chen. Duel Diligence. supra note 5. at 231 
31. Available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerprojectlsctdata.htm. 
32. Documentation, The Supreme Court Justice-Centered Judicial Databases: The 
Warren. Burger. and Rehnquist Courts (1953-2000 Terms) (Sara C. Benesh & Harold J. 
Spaeth, principal investigators). 4 (2003) [hereinafter "Documentation"] 
33. This was established by tabulating the number of issue deviations among the 
cases sorted by "analu=O, and dec_type= 1. 6 or 7." 
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The reason that the number of issue deviations is not mean-
ingful is that the standard for finding a deviation is very high. 
·'These are coded as one if the justice addresses a different law, 
issue, or authority than the majority or addresses one less law, 
issue, or authority than the majority or adds one more law, issue, 
or authority for decision for consideration. "'4 That is, as long as 
the minority speaks to every issue that the majority raises (even 
if dismissively) and that the majority has addressed all the issues 
mentioned by the minority (again, even if only to say that they 
are irrelevant) there will be no indication of a deviation in the 
database. So, once again, the database will provide very little in-
sight as to the dimensionality of the issue space. 
To summarize, the available databases of Supreme Court 
decisions are inadequate to justify the claim that the cases before 
the Court are predominantly one-dimensional. None of the 
coded variables address the issue squarely, and the nature of the 
coding process itself has an inherent bias toward thinking of 
cases as one-dimensional. Perhaps stronger arguments can be 
marshaled in support of the proposition, but until then we stand 
by our earlier assertions. 
But what if we assume that the seekers of the median Jus-
tice really are on firm ground? As a modeling decision, the as-
sumption of a one-dimensional issue space may well be adequate 
to explain a significant percentage of the Justices votes. But we 
are not concerned with overall accuracy in predicting voting. We 
are concerned with the more fine-grained issue of who is the 
median Justice. Is the model adequate for this inquiry? Are they 
consistent with the coalitions that actually form? If Black's theo-
rem applies, then the median Justice will be in every winning 
coalition. How close does the data conform to this prediction? 
According to Martin and his colleagues, Justice O'Connor 
was almost certainly the median justice for the OT terms 2000 
through 2002." According to the Harvard Law Review's annual 
survey of the Court, Justice O'Connor was either in the majority 
or concurring in the judgment, in nonunanimous cases, 83.6, 80.4 
and 87.2% of the time in those three terms.'" This leaves, on av-
erage, about 16% of the cases unaccounted for.' 7 
34. Documentation. supra note 32. at 4. 
35. Martin. et al.. estimate the probability of O'Connor being the median justice as 
0.992. 1.000 (11'). and 0.99~ for each of those years. respectively. Martin. et al.. supra note 
2. at Table 4. 
36. These statistics are taken from the The Statistics section of the annual Supreme 
Court review issues of the Harvard Law Review: 115 Harv. L. Rev. 539, 543 (2001) 
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In fact, in two of these years, OT 2000 and 2001, Justice 
Kennedy appears in the majority more often than O'Connor. In 
2000 and 2001, Kennedy joins the majority or concurs with the 
judgment 87.5% (compared to O'Connor's 83.6%) and 81.5% 
(compared to O'Connor's 80.4%), respectively. In 2002 his 
numbers drop to 81.4% (compared to O'Connor's 87.2%). Nev-
ertheless, if O'Connor is truly the median Justice, how could it 
be that there is a Justice who is in the majority more often? 
The numbers become even more troubling when we limit 
our inquiry to 5-4 decisions, the acid test of the median Justice. 
Again, a true median Justice will be in the majority in all 5-4 de-
cisions. In OT 2002, O'Connor comes quite close to this ideal, 
appearing in the majority in 92.9% of the 5-4 decisions.'x In the 
previous two years, however, she votes with the majority in only 
77.8% and 81.0% of the 5-4 decisions.)') That leaves close to 20% 
of the 5-4 decisions unaccounted for in terms of identifying the 
median Justice. 
It seems that O'Connor does not appear in the majority of 
5-4 decisions as often as a true median Justice would in a one-
dimensional world should. But that is not the largest of the mys-
teries. In OT 2001 and 2002, O'Connor actually appears in a 
higher percentage of 5-4 decisions than in nonunanimous deci-
sions as a whole. In 2001 she was in 81.0% of the 5-4 majorities 
and only 80.4% of the nonunanimous decisions joining or con-
curring in the judgment. In 2002 the numbers were 92.9% of 5-
4's and 87.2% of the nonunanimous majorities. How could this 
happen? It is inconsistent with the median voter theorem and, if 
anything, suggests strategic rather than spatial voting behavior. 
We do not mean to be dismissive of the search for the me-
dian Justice. As Martin et. a!, make clear, there are many situa-
tions in which knowledge of the median Justice is useful as an 
input to other positive political models of the Court. However, 
["Harvard 2000"], 116 Harv. L. Rev. 453. 457 (2002) ["Harvard 2001 '"].and 117 Harv. L. 
Rev. 480, 484 (2003) ["Harvard 2002"]. 
37. The numbers are worse if one restricts attention to those cases in which 
O'Connor joined the majority. If she were the median justice then one might expect the 
numbers to be similar. O'Connor joined the majority in non-unanimous cases Hl.H. 74.5 
and H3.0%. respectively. This leaves. on average, another 4% of cases to be explained. 
Why the median justice is not always signing the majority the opinion might require ex-
planation as well. 
38. Harvard 2002. supra note 36. at 4H4. 
39. Harvard 2000, Harvard 2001. supra note 36. Kennedy does as well as O'Connor 
in 2000 but noticeably lower in 2001 and 2002. appearing in 71.4% and 50% of the 5-4 
decisions in those years. 
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for the purposes of understanding the coalitional nature of the 
Court, and the power that structure imparts to the various Jus-
tices, we think that the data indicate that the one dimensional 
spatial voting model does not adequately capture the data. We 
prefer to work directly with the coalitions that actually mani-
fested themselves rather than with theoretical ones that didn't. 
III. DATA 
Having defined and justified our methods, we are ready to 
present the final statistics for the longest running natural Court 
in history. Tables 1 through 5 present the results from computa-
tions of (1) the Naive Index, computed term-by-term as well as 
cumulatively over time (Tables 1 and 2), (2) the Sophisticated 
Index, computed cumulatively (Table 3), and (3) the Modified 
Median Index, computed term-by-term and cumulatively (Ta-
bles 4 and 5). Recall that the Naive Index measures how often a 
Justice appears in a five-Justice coalition, normalized so that the 
numbers add to 100%. In Tables 1 and 2, the number at the top 
of each cell represents the Justice's voting power expressed as a 
percentage of the Court's overall power; the second line reports 
a judicial quotient, or JQ, which is the power index multiplied by 
nine. The benchmark power index is 11.1%-what the average 
Justice should expect-which corresponds to a JQ of 100. The 
Sophisticated Index reflects the power of individual Justices to 
defect from five-Justice coalitions. The top figure in each cell in 
Table 3 constitutes the normalized value for the total number of 
coalitions in which the Justice had power; again, the average Jus-
tice should achieve a value of 11.1. The bottom figure in each 
cell reflects the JQ for the Sophisticated Index. Finally, the 
Modified Median Index is presented Term by Term as well as 
cumulatively. As noted earlier, this index is computed by tallying 
the number of coalitions of size 5 or greater that contain a par-
ticular Justice, normalized so the scores add to 100. In Tables 4 
and 5, the top value in each cell is the normalized index, the bot-
tom value is JQ. In each table, the maximum score is set in bold 
face. 
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TABLE 1: NAIVE INDEX (TERM BY TERM) 
Term CJ JPS soc AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB 
1994 13.8 10.8 10.8 6.2 1S.4 12.3 4.6 15.4 10.8 
125 97 97 55 138 111 42 138 97 
1995 7.5 10.0 1S.O 10.0 12.5 1S.O 7.5 12.5 10.0 
68 90 13S 90 113 13S 68 113 90 
1996 10.0 16.0 8.0 6.0 16.0 14.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 
90 144 72 54 144 126 72 90 108 
1997 10.9 14.5 10.9 5.5 12.7 10.9 9.1 10.9 14.5 
98 131 98 49 115 98 82 98 131 
1998 9.1 U.7 10.9 10.9 12.7 10.9 10.9 U.7 9.1 
82 ns 98 98 11S 98 98 us 82 
1999 10.9 9.1 12.7 7.3 10.9 14.5 12.7 9.1 12.7 
98 82 115 65 98 131 115 82 115 
2000 10.0 10.0 7.5 12.5 1S.O 12.5 10.0 12.5 10.0 
90 90 68 112 13S 112 90 90 90 
2001 13.8 12.3 9.2 9.2 13.8 9.2 9.2 9.2 13.8 
us 111 84 84 us 84 84 84 us 
2002 11.4 14.3 11.4 11.4 8.6 11.4 8.6 11.4 11.4 
103 U9 103 103 75 103 75 103 103 
2003 10.0 14.0 14.0 6.0 14.0 10.0 8.0 12.0 12.0 
90 U6 U6 54 U6 90 72 108 108 
2004 8.6 8.6 U.9 11.4 11.4 U.9 11.4 10.0 U.9 
75 75 117 103 103 117 103 90 117 
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TABLE 2: NAIVE INDEX (CUMULATIVE) 
Term CJ JPS soc AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB 
1994 13.8 10.8 10.8 6.2 1S.4 12.3 4.6 1S.4 10.8 
125 97 97 55 138 111 42 138 97 
94-95 12.9 9.4 12.9 7.1 14.1 12.9 5.9 14.1 10.6 
116 85 116 64 U7 116 53 U7 95 
94-96 13.6 10.9 10.0 7.3 14.5 13.6 7.3 12.7 10.0 
123 98 90 65 131 123 65 115 90 
94-97 12.5 11.9 10.4 6.7 14.1 12.6 8.1 11.9 11.9 
113 107 93 60 127 113 73 107 107 
94-98 12.7 12.0 10.0 7.3 14.0 12.0 9.3 12.0 10.7 
114 108 90 66 U6 108 84 108 96 
94-99 12.6 11.4 10.3 7.4 14.3 12.6 9.7 10.9 10.9 
113 103 93 67 U9 113 87 98 98 
94-00 11.9 11.4 9.7 8.1 14.1 12.4 9.7 11.4 11.4 
107 103 88 73 U6 112 88 103 103 
94-01 11.8 10.8 9.7 8.7 14.4 12.3 10.3 10.8 11.3 
107 97 88 79 130 111 93 97 102 
94-02 12.0 11.0 10.0 9.0 14.0 12.0 10.0 10.5 11.5 
108 99 90 81 U6 108 90 95 104 
94-03 12.4 11.0 10.5 9.0 13.8 11.9 9.5 10.5 11.4 
112 99 95 81 us 107 86 95 103 
94-04 12.1 10.4 11.3 9.2 13.8 11.7 10.0 10.0 11.7 
109 94 102 83 us 106 90 90 106 
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TABLE 3: SOPHISTICATED INDEX (CUMULATIVE) 
Term CJ JPS soc AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB 
1994 13.3 0.0 20.0 20.0 13.3 6.7 0.0 13.3 13.3 
120 0 180 180 120 60 0 120 120 
94-95 14.3 0.0 19.0 14.3 14.3 9.5 0.0 19.0 9.5 
129 0 171 129 129 86 0 171 86 
94-96 19.4 0.0 16.7 8.3 13.9 13.9 2.8 13.9 11.1 
175 0 150 75 125 125 25 125 100 
94-97 15.4 7.7 11.5 9.6 15.4 13.5 5.8 9.6 11.5 
138 69 104 87 138 121 52 87 104 
94-98 12.9 9.7 11.3 9.7 14.5 12.9 8.1 11.3 9.7 
116 87 102 87 131 116 73 102 87 
94-99 11.4 7.6 10.1 10.1 15.2 16.5 10.1 8.9 10.1 
103 76 91 91 137 148 91 80 91 
94-00 10.6 7.1 9.4 10.6 14.1 18.8 10.6 8.2 10.6 
95 64 85 95 127 169 95 74 95 
94-01 9.8 6.5 8.7 9.8 15.2 19.6 10.9 7.6 12.0 
89 59 79 88 137 177 98 69 108 
94-02 10.1 7.1 9.1 10.1 15.2 18.2 11.1 8.1 11.1 
91 64 82 91 137 164 100 73 100 
94-03 10.4 7.5 10.4 10.4 14.2 17.9 10.4 8.5 10.4 
94 68 94 94 128 161 94 77 94 
94-04 9.5 8.7 10.3 9.5 14.3 17.5 10.3 8.7 11 
86 79 93 86 129 158 93 79 99 
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TABLE 4: MODIFIED MEDIAN (TERM BY TERM) 
Term CJ JPS soc AS AMK DHS cr RBG SGB 
1994 12.6 9.9 10.3 9.4 13.5 12.1 7.6 13.5 11.2 
113 89 93 85 121 109 69 121 101 
1995 10.5 8.9 12.6 10.0 13.2 13.2 8.9 12.1 10.5 
95 81 114 90 118 118 81 109 95 
1996 10.9 9.9 10.3 9.4 14.4 12.4 10.4 11.9 10.4 
98 89 94 85 129 112 94 107 94 
1997 12.4 10.9 11.9 7.4 13.4 12.4 9.4 9.9 12.4 
112 98 107 67 120 112 85 89 112 
1998 10.8 10.8 11.3 12.3 10.8 11.3 9.9 11.3 11.3 
97 97 102 110 97 102 89 102 102 
1999 11.7 8.3 13.3 8.9 11.1 12.8 11.1 11.1 11.7 
105 75 120 80 100 115 100 100 105 
2000 11.3 9.1 10.2 10.8 13.6 13.1 10.2 11.4 10.2 
102 82 92 97 123 118 92 102 92 
2001 13.2 10.6 8.5 8.9 14.0 11.9 9.8 11.1 11.9 
118 95 77 80 126 107 89 100 107 
2002 13.4 10.6 9.9 10.6 12.7 12.7 8.5 12.0 9.9 
120 95 89 95 114 114 77 108 89 
2003 11.9 11.3 12.9 7.7 11.9 10.8 9.3 12.4 11.9 
107 102 117 69 107 97 84 112 107 
2004 9.5 9.5 12.2 10.5 12.3 11.4 10.9 10.5 12.3 
86 86 110 94 111 103 98 94 111 
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TABLE 5: MODIFIED MEDIAN (CUMULATIVE) 
Term CJ JPS soc AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB 
1994 12.6 9.9 10.3 9.4 13.5 12.1 7.6 13.5 11.2 
113 89 93 85 121 109 69 121 101 
94-95 12.1 9.2 11.4 10.2 13.0 12.1 8.9 12.7 10.5 
109 83 103 91 117 109 80 114 94 
94-96 11.8 9.4 10.5 10.2 13.4 12.3 9.7 12.6 10.2 
106 85 94 92 120 111 87 113 92 
94-97 11.6 10.1 10.5 9.7 13.4 12.1 9.9 11.6 11.0 
105 91 95 87 120 109 89 105 99 
94-98 11.7 10.6 10.4 10.2 12.5 11.7 10.2 11.7 11.0 
106 95 93 92 113 106 92 106 99 
94-99 11.8 10.5 10.5 9.9 12.5 12.0 10.3 11.4 11.0 
106 94 94 90 113 108 93 103 99 
94-00 11.5 10.5 10.3 10.1 12.4 12.1 10.5 11.4 11.2 
104 94 93 91 112 109 94 102 101 
94-01 11.6 10.2 9.8 10.2 12.7 12.1 10.8 11.1 11.5 
105 92 89 92 114 109 97 100 104 
94-02 11.7 10.3 9.8 10.3 12.7 12.0 10.6 11.1 11.6 
106 93 89 93 114 108 95 100 105 
94-03 12.0 10.3 10.2 10.3 12.4 11.5 10.6 11.1 11.7 
108 93 92 93 112 104 95 100 106 
94-04 11.8 10.3 10.6 10.3 12.4 11.3 10.8 10.7 11.8 
106 93 95 93 112 102 97 96 106 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A number of observations are readily apparent. For several 
key Justices, we highlight certain patterns that emerge from our 
data calculations. 
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A. JUSTICE KENNEDY 
There is little doubt that Justice Kennedy was the central 
force during this natural court. His power index tops the charts 
in both the Modified Median and Nai"ve Index when these scores 
are calculated cumulatively. He also makes a good showing for 
some years in which these indexes are calculated for the individ-
ual Term. On the Nai"ve Index, Kennedy dominates or is tied 
with another Justice in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2003. 
The Term-by-Term variant of the Modified Median shows Ken-
nedy as the most powerful or among the most powerful in 1994, 
1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2004. The sole instance in 
which Kennedy is routinely outperformed is in the Sophisticated 
Index, where, for cumulative values after 1999, Justice Souter 
reigns supreme. But even under that measure, Kennedy ranks 
second, and is the only other Justice to have power consistently 
in excess of the baseline (11.1% ). In contrast, O'Connor makes a 
less impressive showing, particularly when compared to Ken-
nedy. On the term by term Modified Median, O'Connor exceeds 
the baseline value in six terms, compared to Kennedy's nine. On 
the cumulative Modified Median, O'Connor never exceeds 
11.1 %. The Nai"ve Index reveals a similar dynamic. Thus, while 
others trumpet Justice O'Connor, we remain convinced that 
Kennedy held the real power in the Rehnquist Court. 
B. JUSTICE SOUTER 
Other surprises emerge from our data. Among them is the 
apparent power wielded by Justice Souter during the Rehnquist 
Natural Court. According to the Martin-Quinn scores, Souter is 
among the most liberal Justices on the Court, exceeded in some 
years only by Stevens!" As a consequence, it would appear 
unlikely- at least according to the median voter theorem- that 
he would wield any power on the Court. Yet the cumulative So-
phisticated Index reveals that Justice Souter's vote is quite pow-
erful, particularly when that measure is cumulated after 1998. 
What to make of Justice Souter and the cumulative Sophisti-
cated Index? 
40. For example. in 2004. the Martin-Quinn Score (Posterior Mean) for Souter was 
-1.709. for Ginsberg. -1.606, for Stevens, -2.211. and for Breyer, -1.10~. Since larger nega-
tive values reflect more liberal voting behavior. Souter was scored as a more liberal jus-
tice than both Breyer and Ginsberg. For the Martin-Quinn scores. see 
http:/ /mq scores. wustl.ed uimeasures. ph p. 
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Recall that the Sophisticated Index takes into account the 
credibility of a Justice's threat to defect from a coalition. That 
Justice Souter rates so high on this index is indicative of his fluid-
ity in structuring coalitions and his willingness to gather support 
wherever (and with whomever) he can. William Brennan is often 
lauded as a brilliant strategist within the Court;41 perhaps Souter 
has undertaken that role at least to the extent that he is able to 
form coalitions effectively and flexibly when it serves his policy 
objectives. 
Contrast this with Justice O'Connor. While appearing to be 
a swing voter in any number of votes, Justice O'Connor in fact is 
less than willing to form coalitions outside the predictably con-
servative coalition of Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, 
the usual suspects. Perhaps this is due to her minimalist ap-
proach that calls for very narrow case holdings:2 Carving out the 
narrowest holding may serve to generate a Court majority for a 
particular judgment, but it may cause other Justices to concur 
with the judgment of the Court rather than joining her majority 
opinion. Indeed, recall that we counted a Justice as part of a coa-
lition only if he or she joins the opinion; if he or she concurs in a 
judgment but does not join the opinion then he or she is not part 
of the coalition associated with that opinion. Justice O'Connor's 
exceedingly narrow approach thus may have won her majorities 
behind the judgment, but not allies with respect to her opinions. 
As a result, her standing on the Sophisticated Index suffered, as 
that index measures a Justice's ability to generate opinion coali-
tions in light of his or her credible threat of defection. 
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG 
We had such high hopes for Justice Ginsburg. She was our 
power pageant winner for the 1995 term!' But how the mighty 
have fallen. Her scores in the cumulative measures decrease 
monotonically, ending in a JQ below 100. On the Sophisticated 
Index she could not even break a power index of 90. Will the 
sole feminine voice on the Court be irrelevant?44 
41. BERNARD SCHWARTZ. DECISIO"-i: HOW THE SL:PREME COURT DECIDES 
CASES 170 (1'196) (describing Justice Brennan as the ''strategist behind Supreme Court 
jurisprudence") 
42. Cass Sunstein. Prohlems with Minima/ism. SX STAN. L. REV. 1 X'l'l. 1'101-02 
(2006) (distinguishing O'Connor for her minimalist jurisprudence. asking for narrow 
rather than broad Court rulings). 
43. Edelman & Chen. Dangerous Justice. supra note 5. at '15. 
44. For a discussion of the feminist voice on the Supreme Court. see Suzanna 
218 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:199 
Alas, we fear so. The Sophisticated Index is particularly tell-
ing in this regard. She seems to have very few viable coalition 
partners, and so her threats to defect are not credible. That, cou-
pled with the very few times she is ever in the majority, signal 
her impotence to influence the Court. 
E. JUSTICE BREYER 
While Justice Ginsburg has seen her power wane, it is per-
haps time for us to make another Erediction on who will be the 
next Justice to be reckoned with.' Our choice for the Justice 
with the bullet is Justice Breyer. In both the Modified Mean and 
the Naive Index his power is increasing monotonically. While he 
has just crawled above the 100 power mark, certainly his mo-
mentum is positive and he looks to be making a difference. In 
addition, his Sophisticated Index score indicates that he is able 
to make credible threats of defection. All this bodes well for 
Breyer, although the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Alita may well alter this trend. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The results presented here challenge the conventional wis-
dom in several respects. First, although Sandra Day O'Connor 
was lauded as the critical swing Justice in the Rehnquist Court, 
by our measures she was not as powerful as some have argued. 
That is not to say that her retirement from the Court will not 
make a profound difference in particular cases. We have already 
seen such an impact in the recent abortion decision, Gonzales v. 
Carhart (2007),4 in which the Court upheld the federal Partial 
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. Other cases will also result in 
shifts in doctrine due to Justice O'Connor's replacement by Jus-
tice Alita. But the measures we present here reflect not only the 
importance of the swing vote (particularly the Modified Median 
measure), but also the ability of individual Justices to muster a 
majority coalition that unifies behind a doctrinal standard or ap-
proach as expressed in a single opinion. Because of its implica-
Sherry. Civic Virtue and rhe Feminine Voice in Consrirurional .furispmden<:e, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 543 (19~6). 
45. What's another failed prediction among friends~ Or. as one of us wrote earlier 
in a more poetic vein. "Write today. regret tomorrow. renounce mafiana." Jim Chen. The 
Magniji<:enr Seven: American Telephony's Deregularory Slwurour. 50 HASTINGS L.J. 
1503.15~0 (1999). 
46 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
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tions for the rule of law, this standard is meaningful for reasons 
that extend beyond the simple analysis of the Justices' votes to 
affirm or reverse. Fragmented coalitions have the potential to 
undermine the clarity of legal standards as expressed in Supreme 
Court precedent. The most powerful Justices-particularly as 
measured by our Sophisticated Index- are those who can form 
coalitions that speak with a unified voice. Perhaps this standard 
for judicial power therefore measures the attribute that should 
concern us most. 
Second, according to our measures, Justices Kennedy and 
Souter stand out most prominently. Justice Kennedy is now 
commonly assumed to occupy the power center on the Court, 
but it appears that he did so during the Rehnquist Court as well. 
Souter, on the other hand, exercised power in a more subtle 
fashion than Kennedy, given his flexibility with various coali-
tions on the Court. While Kennedy's star may continue to rise 
with the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, the 
future is less certain for Souter, who may have more difficulty 
forming coalitions with these new conservative members. After 
several terms of the Roberts Court, we look forward to recom-
puting our figures to assess who, in fact, will have emerged as the 
contemporary Court's most dangerous Justice. 
